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ALLOWANCE OF "INTEREST" ON UNLIQUIDATED
TORT DAMAGES IN PENNSYLVANIA
This Comment deals with the problem in Pennsylvania of com-
pensating a plaintiff for the detention of his unliquidated tort
damages between the time of the destruction of, or damage to, his
real or personal property, or injury to his person, and the time
when he is awarded a verdict for such damages. Compensation for
detention of damages pursuant to statutory rights, such as survival1
and wrongful death 2 acts, will not be considered.
Part one of this Comment will analyze the historical develop-
ment of the rules of law in Pennsylvania by which a plaintiff is
compensated for the detention of his damages from the time of the
destruction of, or damage to, his property to the time when he re-
ceives a verdict for such destruction or damage. The treatment
given this problem in other jurisdictions will be examined in part
two. The final part of this Comment will compare and analyze
methods used to treat this problem in Pennsylvania and certain
other jurisdictions, and will offer a conclusion as to the remedial
effect of legislation pending in the Commonwealth.
I. THE LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA
The problem of compensating a plaintiff for detention of his
unliquidated tort damages 3 from the time of damage or injury has
had a changing history in Pennsylvania. This change does not re-
sult from the method of compensating the plaintiff, but rather from
confusion over whether to call the compensation "interest ' 4 or
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.601 (1950).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 601 (1953).
3. H. OLECK, DAMAGES TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY § 63 (1961):
When damages are uncertain in amount, and need to be estab-
lished by agreement or by a jury or court, they are said to be"unliquidated damages."
Id.
4. "Interest," with respect to use of money (for loss of its use)
is the compensation set by parties, or fixed by the law, for the
use, forbearance, or detention of money. Or, it is the damages
granted by the law for loss of use of the money which would make
an injury whole, computed from the time when the injury oc-
curred.
Id. § 295, n.3; C. MCCORMACK, DAMAGES § 50 (1935):
"Interest" is compensation allowed by law or fixed by the
parties for the use or detention of money, or allowed by law as
additional damages for loss of use of the money due as damages,
during the lapse of time from the accrual of the claim.
Id. at 205.
"compensation for the delay, of which the rate of interest affords
the fair legal measure." 5 The following discussion of this chrono-
logical change in terminology will reveal that a plaintiff may or
may not recover compensation for detention of his damages, de-
pending upon the terminology used by a judge in his charge to the
jury, and will also elicit all other important factors which a court
and jury must consider before allowing a plaintiff compensation for
detention of his unliquidated tort damages in Pennsylvania.
The first case of interest is Railroad Co. v. Gesner,6 wherein the
defendant railroad took plaintiff decedent's lands by virtue of an
Act of Assembly,7 but without making the required compensation to
the decedent. The plaintiff's decedent didn't prosecute his claim
during his lifetime because of his mental incapacity. On certiorari,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the plaintiff's dece-
dent was entitled to interest on his "demand for justice against
those who have so long had the use of his property without conde-
scending to pay the slightest regard to his rights."8
Two important factors should be noted in Gesner. First, the
court awarded interest eo nomine.9 This illustrates the fact that in-
terest eo nomine was readily allowed on unliquidated damages in
Pennsylvania in 1853, from the time of the event to the time a ver-
dict was rendered.
As will be seen in the following cases, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court later decided that it would not allow interest eo
nomine for the detention of the plaintiff's damages from the time of
the event to the time a verdict was rendered. Instead, a trial judge
or jury would be allowed to award "compensation for the delay, of
which the rate of interest affords the fair legal measure."'10 The
second factor to be noted in Gesner is that the court awarded in-
terest eo nomine for detention of damages from the time of the
event because of culpable conduct on the defendant railroad's part.
Thus, in 1853, the plaintiff was not entitled to such interest as a
matter of right, but only if the detention of the damages was caused
by the defendant's inexcusable reluctance to pay them. If the plain-
tiff had asked for an unreasonable sum in settlement the defendant
would have had a valid excuse for not paying the damages before
suit. In such a case the plaintiff would not be entitled to interest
from the date of damage or destruction. Although this rationale is
implicit in Gesner, later cases have clarified this reasoning.'1
5. Marrazzo v. Scranton Nehi Bottling Co., 438 Pa. 72, 75, 263 A.2d
336, 337 (1970).
6. 20 Pa. 240 (1853).
7. Id.
8. Railroad Co. v. Gesner, 20 Pa. 240, 242 (1853).
9. Interest eo nomine is Latin for interest "under that name".
10. Marrazzo v. Scranton Nehi Bottling Co., 438 Pa. 72, 75, 263 A.2d
336, 337 (1970).
11. E.g., Marrazzo v. Scranton Nehi Bottling Co., 438 Pa. 72, 263 A.2d




Gesner was not a tort action. Instead, it was very similar to a
proceeding in eminent domain. However, later Pennsylvania
cases 12 cited Gesner as authority for the proposition that interest
eo nomine could be allowed from the time of damage or destruction
on unliquidated tort damages. It was sound reasoning to cite
Gesner for such a proposition, because the reason "underlying the
award of damages for damage to or destruction of property is the
same as that which applies in awarding damages or compensation
in eminent domain cases, viz., to give the injured party full com-
pensation for the loss that he has suffered;. ... 13
Gesner was followed four years later in Delaware, Lack. &
W. R.R. v. Burson,14 an action also more similar to condemnation
than tort. Interest eo nomine was allowed at the jury's discretion,
based upon the defendant's "wrongful" detention of the damages.' 5
Four years later, in Pennsylvania R.R. v. Patterson," the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court allowed interest eo nomine on a plaintiff's
unliquidated losses from the time they were sustained. The impor-
tant thing about Patterson is that it was a tort action brought in
case and was not similar to an eminent domain proceeding. There-
fore, in 1873 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was allowing interest
eo nomine on unliquidated tort damages from the time of the dam-
age or destruction. One anomaly about Patterson is that the trial
judge instructed the jury that if they found that the defendant's
negligence caused the plaintiff's injury, his damages "would include
interest on his losses from the time they were sustained."1 7 In ef-
fect, the trial judge gave the jury a mandatory instruction to allow
interest if they found that the plaintiff's damages had been caused
by the defendant's negligence. This is unusual because in almost all
other cases interest has been awarded at the discretion of the trier
of facts.' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court approved the entire
12. E.g., Bare v. Hoffman, 79 Pa. 71 (1875).
13. Chesapeake & 0. Ref. Co. v. Elk Ref. Co., 186 F.2d 30, 35 (4th
Cir. 1950).
14. 61 Pa. 369 (1869).
15. Id. at 374.
16. 73 Pa. 491 (1873). In this case the defendant was statutorily ob-
ligated to repair a certain canal and canal locks which is bought from the
state. The defendant failed to meet this obligation and as a result the
plaintiff carrier brought suit for damages he suffered for delay in hauling
his cargoes and that he was required to haul lesser cargoes than those
offered to him because of the disrepair.
17. Id. at 499 (emphasis added).
18. See, e.g., Marrazzo v. Scranton Nehi Bottling Co., 438 Pa. 72,
263 A.2d 336 (1970); Conover v. Bloom, 269 Pa. 548, 112 A. 752 (1921); Ste-
venson v. Ebervale Coal Co., 203 Pa. 316, 52 A. 201 (1902); Richards v.
Citizens Natural Gas Co., 130 Pa. 37, 18 A. 600 (1889).
instruction."9
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Bare v. Hoff a n,20 an 1875
tort action brought in case, held that the jury could award the plain-
tiff interest on his unliquidated tort damages. The jury was al-
lowed to compute interest eo nomine on the damages from the date
of the damage if, in light of all the facts, it felt the plaintiff was en-
titled to such interest. The court cited Railroad Co. v. Gesner
2 1
as authority for its holding.2 2 Thus, in 1875, the rule of law in
Pennsylvania was that a plaintiff could recover interest on his un-
liquidated tort damages to property from the time of the happening
of the event. He could recover such interest at the discretion of
the trier of the facts, based upon all the facts of the case. This im-
plicitly overruled Patterson, which said the trial judge could give
the jury binding instructions to allow interest.2
Several years later, in Weir v. County of Allegheny,24 it was
held that if a defendant's liability for property damage arose en-
tirely from a statute which did not provide for interest, then the
plaintiff could not be awarded interest from the date of the event
until the date he recovered a judgment. This holding did not
affect the allowance of interest in cases wherein liability was not
predicated upon a statute.2 5 Interest eo nomine was still allowable
in ordinary tort cases on the theory that without "the addition of in-
terest on the value of the property from the time it was destroyed,
the remedy of the plaintiffs would be destroyed."2  But, in 1883,
the year previous to that in which the court uttered the holding
cited in the preceding sentence, it cited Weir as standing for the
proposition that interest was not allowable on unliquidated tort
damages.2 7  An examination of Pittsburg S.R.R. v. Taylor,2s the
case which presented this proposition, shows that the court prob-
ably stated it because the trial judge had instructed the jury that
they could allow interest on any lump sum verdict they might
award the plaintiff for the property damage and physical injuries
for which he was suing. The primary holding of Taylor was that
interest could not be allowed on personal injuries from the time of
the injury.29 For this reason the court apparently decided that
19. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Patterson, 73 Pa. 491, 501 (1873).
20. 79 Pa. 71 (1875). In this case the defendant was held to be liable
for damages resulting from his diverting water needed by the plaintiff to
run his tannery.
21. 20 Pa. 240 (1853).
22. Bare v. Hoffman, 79 Pa. 71, 78 (1875).
23. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
24. 95 Pa. 413 (1880). The plaintiff brought his action for damages
to his property caused by a rioting mob. The county's liability for such
damages arose wholly by reason of an Act of Assembly.
25. See City of Allegheny v. Campbell, 107 Pa. 530, 535 (1884).
26. Id.
27. Pittsburgh S.R.R. v. Taylor, 104 Pa. 306 (1884).
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Wittmer v. Bessemer & L.E.R.R., 241 Pa. 112, 116, 88 A.
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interest could not be allowed on a verdict in which damages for
personal injuries were not separated from damages for injury to
property.
Confusion over whether interest on unliquidated tort damages
to property could be awarded followed the decision in Pittsburg S.
R.R. v. Taylor.8 0 In Township of Plymouth v. Graver"1 the plain-
tiff sued for the death of his horse caused by the defendant's negli-
gence. The trial court instructed the jury that they could allow in-
terest from the date of the horse's death on whatever damages they
might award. The defendant appealed and the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court affirmed, stating:
It is true the plaintiff was not entitled to interest, as
such, upon the value of his horse, but on computing the
amount of the damages, the jury may consider the time
which has elapsed since the injury was received. There is
some conflict in the cases, (Railroad Co. v. Taylor, 104 Pa.
St. 306; Allegheny v. Campbell, 107 Pa. St. 530), but this we
think is the rule generally recognized. The instruction of
the court in this respect was perhaps not strictly accurate,
but the verdict was small, and the amount of the interest
unimportant. We do not feel that we should disturb the
judgment on that ground.
82
It is submitted that this holding was the genesis of the doctrine in
Pennsylvania that the jury may award the plaintiff compensation
for the detention of his damages from the time of the event, but that
such compensation must never be called "interest". This was done
by intentionally or inadvertently misinterpreting the holding in
Pittsburg S.R.R. v. Taylor"8 and by impliedly adopting the hold-
ings of whatever other jurisdictions may have had such a doctrine
at that time. The factor which probably prompted the court to
adopt this doctrine is buried in the history of the legal concept of
"interest"., 4 Thus, interest eo nomine was no longer allowed on
unliquidated tort damages from the time of the happening of the
event. Instead, the trier of the facts, in its discretion, could award
compensation for the time elapsed during which the plaintiff was
deprived of his damages.35
314, 315 (1913); McGonnell v. Pittsburgh Ry., 234 Pa. 396, 400, 83 A. 282, 283
(1912).
30. 104 Pa. 306 (1884).
31. 125 Pa. 24, 17 A. 251 (1889).
32. Id. at 37, 17 A. at 251.
33. 104 Pa. 306 (1884).
34. This factor is that interest has long been legally equated with the
unpleasant word "usury". See discussion in section II of this Comment,
infra.
35. Just what amount should be given will be shown in later cases.
The distinguishing between "interest" and "compensation for
detention of damages" did not have serious consequences in Town-
ship of Plymouth v. Graver3 6 because the court considered the
amount awarded to be too small to warrant striking off. The ques-
tion remained, however, as to what might be done if a trial court
erroneously were to instruct the jury that they might award in-
terest instead of instructing them that they may award compensa-
tion for detention of damages, and the jury were then to award a
large sum. The answer to this question will be found by unfold-
ing the remaining history in Pennsylvania of the distinction be-
tween interest and detention of damages.
In 1889, in Reading & P.R.R. v. Balthaser,37 the same year as the
decision in Township of Plymouth v. Graver,38 the plaintiff brought
an action to recover damages for the defendant's appropriation of
her lands. The trial court instructed the jury that they might allow
interest from the time of the appropriation on any damages they
might award. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said this was
error. A jury should be told to allow interest on damages ex con-
tractu, but in an action ex delicto they must be told to consider the
lapse of time between the happening of an injury and the time of
trial in making up the amount of damages. In arriving at this com-
pensation they were to consider ". . . the nature of the wrong, the
attending circumstances, and the time when it was committed,
" . .-39 As to the disposition of the case the court said:
We might not have reversed for this alone, but, as the case
goes back for other reasons, we again call attention to this
well-settled distinction between actions resting on con-
tract and, those growing out of a tort, so far as interest is
concerned.
40
Two other cases decided in 1899 give the present day rule as to
what factors the jury should consider in deciding whether to allow
compensation for detention of damages and how the value of such
compensation is to be measured. As to measuring the value of such
compensation, in Pennsylvania S.V.R.R. v. Zeimer4l the court said:
In cases of this kind interest is not allowed as interest, but
it is usual to instruct the jury to increase the damages by
that amount. In other words, interest is allowed as dam-
ages. If it were otherwise, a person whose property had
(This theory of allowing damages for the time elapsed since the injury
will be referred to as "compensation for detention of damages" in the re-
mainder of this Comment).
36. 125 Pa. 37, 17 A. 251 (1889).
37. 126 Pa. 1, 17 A. 518 (1889).
38. 125 Pa. 37, 17 A. 251 (1889).
39. Reading & P.R.R. v. Balthaser, 126 Pa. 1, 12, 17 A. 518, 519 (1889).
40. Id.
41. 124 Pa. 560, 17 A. 187 (1889). In this case the plaintiffs brought
an action for consequential damages caused by the construction of de-
fendant's railroad. The plaintiffs claimed the new construction interfered




been taken, injured or destroyed would not receive full
satisfaction. Railroad Co. v. Miller, 125 Mass. 1; Railroad
Co. v. Burson, 61 Pa. St. 369.42
Hence, the interest rate is used to compensate a plaintiff for deten-
tion of his damages, but it must not be called interest eo nomine.
As authority for the proposition that this is the only way to make
the plaintiff whole, the court cited Lack. & W. R.R. v. Burson,4" a
case which allowed a plaintiff interest eo nomine. The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court admitted that there is confusion inherent in
such a distinction between interest eo nomine and "compensation
for detention of damages, measured by the interest rate." It made
this admission in Richards v. Citizens Natural Gas Company,44 in
which it also set forth some of the factors the jury should consider
in deciding whether to allow compensation for detention. The court
said:
... the jury may allow additional damages in the nature
of interest for the lapse of time. It is never interest as
such, nor as a matter of right, but compensation for the
delay of which the rate of interest affords the fair legal
measure.
These principles have been very recently affirmed by
this court in Railroad Co. v. Zeimer, and Plymouth Twp. v.
Graver; and although, as said by our Brother Clark, in the
last case, there is some conflict in the decisions; it is not so
much in regard to the principles as in the mode of ex-
pression. The contest has been whether the allowance
should be made or not, and the name by which it should be
called, whether interest or compensation for delay, mea-
sured by the rate of interest, received little attention, and
it was incautiously said that interest was or was not to be
allowed. The distinction, however, is important, for failure
to observe it leads to confusion, as in the present case. In-
terest is recoverable of right, but compensation for de-
fered payment in torts depends on the circumstances of
each case. The plaintiff may have set his damages so in-
ordinately high as to have justified the defendant in refus-
ing to pay, or in other ways the delay may be plaintiff's
fault; or the liability of defendant may have arisen with-
out fault, as in Weir v. County of Allegheny [citations
omitted]. In such cases the jury would not and certainly
ought not to make the allowance.45
It can be seen, therefore, that when the delay in payment of com-
42. Id. at 571, 17 A. at 188.
43. 61 Pa. 369 (1869).
44. 130 Pa. 37, 18 A. 600 (1889). The plaintiff was suing for injury to
his house, caused by an explosion of natural gas which had escaped from
defendant's pipes.
45. Id. at 40, 18 A. at 600.
pensation is the plaintiff's fault, such as when he makes an un-
reasonable settlement demand which the defendant is justified in
refusing to pay, the jury may well find that he is not entitled to
compensation for the delay.4 6
The result of Richards shows the injustice which can result
from preserving a distinction between "interest" and "compensation
for delay measured by the interest rate." After admitting that
failure to observe the distinction causes confusion, the court then
justified the distinction by saying that interest is something which
can only be awarded as a matter of right.4 7 No explanation was
given as to why this might be so. Then, because the trial judge had
instructed the jury that it might award interest on the plaintiff's
damages, that amount of the award was stricken off the plaintiff's
judgment. Yet, if the trial court had instructed the jury that it
could compensate the plaintiff for the delay in payment of his
damages and measure the compensation at the legal interest rate,
the plaintiff would have kept the full amount of his judgment.
The court justified this result by saying that by definition "in-
terest" is something which is payable as a matter of right, and thus
can't be awarded as discretionary compensation.
48
Interest eo nomine has been awarded when it was due the
plaintiff as a matter of right on damages for the taking of his land
by eminent domain proceedings.4 9 But, the fact that this is so does
not justify refusing to call the same form of compensation interest
when it is awarded in a discretionary manner. This is especially
true when the refusal results in depriving a plaintiff of part of his
judgment. Despite this, in 1894, the court refused to adopt a dif-
ferent rule because no statute provided for interest eo nomine from
the date of damage or destruction and because the maxim "stare
decisis" was a sufficient answer to any proposal to change the
rule.50 This seems inconsistent, since interest was originally al-
lowed on unliquidated tort damages and this was later changed by
the same court's decisions. 5'
There is one anomaly in this line of cases5 2 which hold that
compensation for detention of damages is allowed in the discretion
46. Accord, Conover v. Bloom, 269 Pa. 548, 112 A. 752 (1921); Pierce
v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. (No. 2), 232 Pa. 170, 81 A. 142 (1911).
47. Richards v. Citizens Natural Gas Company, 130 Pa. 37 40, 18 A.
600 (1889).
48. Id.
49. Weiss v. Borough of South Bethlehem, 136 Pa. 294, 20 A. 801
(1890).
50. See, Klages v. Philadelphia & Reading Terminal Co., 160 Pa. 386,
28 A. 862 (1894).
51. E.g., Township of Plymouth v. Graver, 125 Pa. 37, 17 A. 251 (1889);
Pittsburgh S.R.R. v. Taylor, 104 Pa. 306 (1884).
52. E.g., Conover v. Bloom, 269 Pa. 548, 112 A. 752 (1921); Pierce v.
Lehigh Valley Coal Co. (No. 2), 232 Pa. 170, 81 A. 142 (1911); James
McNeil & Bro. Co. v. Crucible Steel Co. of America, 207 Pa. 493, 56 A. 1067
(1904); Irvine v. Smith, 204 Pa. 58, 53 A. 510 (1902); Richards v. Citizens
Natural Gas Co., 130 Pa. 37, 18 A. 600 (1889).
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of the trier of fact. That anomaly is Stevenson v. Ebervale Coal
Company,53 in which the court said the plaintiff had set his damages
so inordinately high that the trial court should have peremptorily
instructed the jury that the plaintiff could not receive any compen-
sation for detention of his damages.54 This is the only case be-
sides Pennsylvania R.R. v. Patterson5 in which a Pennsylvania
court has been allowed to take the question of allowing compensa-
tion for detention of damages away from the jury.
It has been held that a trial court cannot give a jury binding
instructions that they must award the paintiff compensation for the
detention of his damages.56 This is in line with the discretionary
nature of the relief.
Thus, the proposition that "... in Pennsylvania, interest, as
such, is not allowed, in actions sounding in tort, when the damages
sought to be recovered are unliquidated. . . . 57 has continued un-
abated down to the present time. The confusion inherent in the
older cases is still present. In 1970 this confusion was manifested
in Marrazzo v. Scranton Nehi Bottling Company.58 In that case the
defendant negligently destroyed the plaintiffs' building and per-
sonal property. At trial, with the judge sitting as the trier of fact,
the defendant was found liable for the plaintiffs' damages. The
judge awarded damages for the loss of the plaintiffs' building, ma-
chinery and equipment. He ordered interest to be paid on both
amounts from the date of the fire.5 9 The defendant filed excep-
tions to this and the court en banc, after apparently recognizing the
verbal distinction between interest and compensation for delay,
said the interest would be allowed to run only from the date suit
was instituted.60 The Common Pleas Court en banc held that this
was a more appropriate date in fairness to all parties concerned be-
cause it appeared obvious that the trial judge could not properly as-
sign cause for the delay to either party exclusively." Both parties
appealed. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said in its majority
opinion that the "court en banc erred in speculating that the trial
judge felt he could not assign cause for the delay to either party
exclusively. ' 62 In disposing of the case the court said:
53. 203 Pa. 316, 52 A. 201 (1902).
54. Id. at 333, 52 A. at 202.
55. 73 Pa. 491 (1873).
56. Campbell v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 58 Pa. Super. 241 (1914).
57. Girard Trust Corn Exch. Bank v. Brink's Inc., 422 Pa. 48, 57, 220
A.2d 827, 832 (1966).
58. 438 Pa. 72, 263 A.2d 336 (1970).
59. Id. at 74, 263 A.2d at 337.
60. Id. at 76, 263 A.2d at 337.
61. Id. at 76, 263 A.2d at 338.
62. Id.
The record does disclose a wide gap between the plaintiff's
demands and the final award, but this fact alone is not
dispositive of the issue. All circumstances relevant to the
delay must be developed and analyzed.
The judgment as to interest must be vacated and the
record remanded so that the trial court can make findings
of fact and conclusions of law as to the delay and deter-
mine whether compensation for that delay should be part
of the final award.6 3
Thus, the court was reaffirming the rule that whether or not a
plaintiff receives compensation for detention of his damages rests
solely in the discretion of the trier of the facts.
In the majority opinion the court expounded the law on the
matter in Pennsylvania as it stands today:
Although there is language in some early cases to the
contrary, [citations omitted], it is now the settled law in
this Commonwealth that interest, as such, is not allowed
in tort actions when the damages sought to be recovered
are unliquidated. [citations omitted].
This court, however, has developed the doctrine that:
.there are cases sounding in tort, and cases of unliqui-
dated damages, where not only the principle on which the
recovery is to be had is compensation, but where also the
compensation can be measured by market value or other
definite standards. Such are the cases of the unintentional
conversion or destruction of property, etc. Into these cases
the element of time may enter as an important factor, and
the plaintiff will not be fully compensated unless he re-
ceive, not only the value of his property, but receive it, as
nearly as may be, as of the date of his loss. Hence it is that
the jury may allow additional damages, in the nature of in-
terest, for the lapse of time. It is never interest as such,
nor as a matter of right, but compensation for the delay, of
which the rate of interest affords the fair legal measure."
[citations omitted]. We have emphasized that compensa-
tion for delay in payment is not a matter of right but is an
issue for the finder of fact, the resolution of which depends
upon all the circumstances of the case.
64
The court then went on to hold that the onus for the delay in
payment of such unliquidated tort damages should fall upon the
party responsible for the delay. The court said:
In Pierce v. Lehigh Valley Coal Company (No. 2), [ci-
tation omitted], we outlined one important element: "The
right to compensation . . . is, therefore, usually a question
for the jury under the evidence submitted. If the fault in
nonpayment of the claim rests with the defendant he can-
not complain if he is required to compensate for the delay.
If on the other hand the fault lies with the plaintiff by rea-
son of an excessive and unconscionable demand, one which
the defendant is required to protect himself against by liti-
gation, he should not be penalized for the unwarranted con-
duct of the plaintiff and required to pay damages for the
63. Id. at 76-77, 263 A.2d at 338.
64. Id. at 74-75, 263 A.2d at 337.
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delay in the settlement of the claim." [citations omitted].
The theory behind this element is the belief that the de-
fendant would have been willing to settle the case at a
much earlier stage if the plaintiff had made a reasonable
demand and because the plaintiff made an unreasonable
demand he cannot complain that he had not the use of the
money during the period of litigation. The burden of
proving that the demand was unreasonable is upon the de-
fendant. [citation omitted] .65
Chief Justice Bell wrote a dissenting opinion which presented
the view that neither interest eo nomine nor compensation for de-
tention of damages could be recovered in such a case:
I dissent, and would not allow any interest in this
trespass case. It is, and for a long time has been, the
settled law in this Commonwealth that interest as such is
not allowed in tort actions when the damages sought to be
recovered are unliquidated: [citations omitted]. If there
are to be any exceptions, I believe they should not be ap-
plicable in this case.
66
Perhaps the dissenting opinion did not see any difference be-
tween interest eo nomine and "compensation for delay." Or, per-
haps it meant that, since the trial judge had awarded interest eo
nomine, that entire portion of the judgment should be stricken.
Whatever the meaning of the dissenting opinion, it exemplifies the
confusion, which apparently exists even in the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, inherent in the doctrine of distinguishing between
interest eo nomine and "compensation for detention of damages,
measured by the interest rate."
II. INTEREST As USURY
The confusion engendered by the doctrine of not allowing in-
terest eo nomine on unliquidated tort damages and the unjust re-
sults which it can sometimes produce would seem to call for its
repudiation. Before this can be recommended, the basis of the
doctrine must be discovered to see if the reason behind it outweighs
the results it produces.
History probably provides the best explanation for the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court's disdain for the use of the word "interest"
to describe compensation for delay measured by the legal interest
rate. Historically, usury was not favored by the law, and the word
"interest" was synonymous with "usury" in early times. Thus:
It is only in modern times that the practice of bargain-
ing for conventional interest has come to be sanctioned
65. Id. at 75-76, 263 A.2d at 338.
66. Id. at 77, 263 A.2d at 338-339 (dissenting opinion).
by law. Formerly, all agreed compensation for the use of
money was condemned as "usury", but now the term
"usury" has come to be applied only to excessive interest
above the lawful rate avowed by statute. The inherent re-
ligious prejudices against interest generally have slowed
the development of the practice of giving interest as dam-
ages.
67
In Pennsylvania it would seem that interest eo nomine was first
allowed at the discretion of the jury, and was later allowed at the
jury's discretion under the name "compensation for delay." The
ancient prejudice attached to the word "interest" probably accounts
for the change in name.
This prejudice was evident as long ago as the time of Aristotle
and Plato. It was especially strong when the law regarding in-
terest began to develop in medieval England. At this time the
main industry was agriculture and the church dictated the morals
of the times. Thus:
In this early pastoral stage, the highest ethical stand-
ards enjoined the giving of charity to those in need, or at
least the making of gratuitous loans, and frowned upon the
taking of recompense for lending to the needy. Since the
needy were the only borrowers, the practice of "usury"-re-
ceiving any recompense for money lent-was condemned
outright. Thus Plato and Aristotle in Greece regarded
lending on interest as unworthy, and Moses invoked the
sanction of religion against the practice. Philosophy and
religion were reinforced by the power of a sounding meta-
phor, "money cannot breed money." The Christian Church
zealously espoused this moral concept, and throughout the
medieval period the canon law absolutely forbade the re-
ceipt by Christians of recompense for the lending of money.
... By the end of the Medieval period, however, mercantile
and industrial enterprise had come to assume an ever in-
creasingly important share in the economic system of Eu-
rope. A practice which was oppressive and extortionate
when applied to the poor peasant borrower was helpful
and stimulating to trade when applied to the merchant
seeking to finance the sale of his wares abroad.6 8
This stigma of moral and religious taboos has distorted the
growth of the law regarding compensation for delay in paying
damages.6 9 This is unfortunate because the evil of unconscionable
extortion is absent when a court exacts interest instead of a money-
lender.
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It is submitted that the historical considerations quoted above
are the true reasons why the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will not
allow interest eo nomine but, instead, insists that the award must
be expressed as compensation for detention of damages, measured
67. C. McCORMACK, DAMAGES § 51 at 206 (1935).
68. Id. at 207 (footnotes omitted).




by the interest rate. "The rule may have a proper field of opera-
tion where the allowance can only be based on a more or less in-
definite estimate, but otherwise the distinction is a mere verbal
one."7 1 It is further submitted that the confusion and injustice
worked by such a verbal distinction, especially since it has no valid
basis for existing, should call for the overruling of the distinc-
tion. Since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court brought the distinc-
tion into existence by implicitly overruling previous decisions,
72
it could now overrule the distinction.
III. COMPENSATION FOR DETENTION OF DAMAGES IN PERSONAL
INJURY CASES IN PENNSYLVANIA
The rule regarding compensation for delay in payment of dam-
ages for personal injury is quite simple in Pennsylvania. The rule
is that there can be no such compensation from the time of the in-
jury until the time a verdict is rendered.7 It is said that this is be-
cause in "a personal injury case the damages are assessed as of the
date of the trial and not of the injury; hence there can be no gen-
eral compensation for delay [citations omitted] .-74
IV. THE LAW IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Upon examining decisions from various jurisdictions, other
than Pennsylvania's, involving compensation for detention of un-
liquidated tort damages, it will be noted that ". . . these decisions
reflect a degree of confusion not easily found in any other field of
the law."75 An examination of the cases which follow will show
that the hand of history, in the form of prejudice against usury, has
lain heavily on many jurisdictions.
A. Real or personal property
Pennsylvania and South Carolina76 are perhaps the only two
jurisdictions which hold that interest eo nomine may not be
awarded. These two jurisdictions allow "compensation for deten-
tion of damages" rather than interest eo nomine. However, in
71. Stevens-Scott Grain Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 96 Kan. 1, 2,
149 P. 744 (1915) (emphasis added).
72. E.g., Township of Plymouth v. Graver, 125 Pa. 37, 17 A. 251
(1889).
73. See, Rice v. Hill, 315 Pa. 166, 172 A. 289 (1934); Conover v.
Bloom, 269 Pa. 548, 112 A. 752 (1921).
74. McGonnell v. Pittsburgh Ry., 234 Pa. 346, 399-400, 83 A. 282, 283
(1911).
75. Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 345 (1954).
76. See, Knight v. Sullivan Power Co., 140 S.C. 296, 138 S.E. 818 (1927).
South Carolina it has been held that if the trial judge inadvertently
instructs the jury that it may allow interest eo nomine, that instruc-
tion will not be grounds for error if the jury returns a lump sum
verdict. 77 This means that as long as the jury does not mention the
word interest in rendering its verdict, the fact that it did allow such
interest pursuant to the judge's instructions will not be grounds
for striking any amount off the verdict.
In most jurisdictions the owner can recover interest eo nomine
as compensation for detention of his damages at the jury's discre-
tion,78 ". . . at least where the amount of damages is determinable
by fixed rules of evidence and known standards of value. .. .
In many of these jurisdictions interest eo nomine is allowed by
statute, either at the jury's discretion8 0 or as a matter of right.8 '
Conversely, there is authority82 "to the effect that there can be no
recovery of interest in an action to recover unliquidated damages
for an injury to realty. . .,s3 unless provided for by statute.
As the preceding discussion shows, there are various methods
of compensating a plaintiff for the detention of his unliquidated
tort damages.. This variety reflects the difficulty the various
courts have experienced in dealing with the concept of interest.
77. Id. at 304, 138 S.E. at 820-821.
78. E.g., Young v. New York, N.E. & H.R. Co., 273 Mass. 567, 174 N.E.
318 (1931); Lucas v. Wattles, 49 Mich. 380, 13 N.W. 782 (1882); State v.
Hale, 136 Tex. 29, 146 S.W.2d 731 (1941).
79. 25 C.J.S. DAMAGES § 53 (1966).
80. E.g., Co-N. GEN. STAT. AN. § 37-3 (1969).
Interest at the rate of six per cent a year, and no more, may
be recovered and allowed in civil actions, including actions to re-
cover money loaned at a greater rate, as damages for the deten-
tion of money after it becomes payable.
Id.
81. N.Y. Ci. PaAc. § 5001 (McKinney 1963).
(a) Actions in which recoverable. Interest shall be recovered
upon a sum awarded because of a breach of performance of a
contract, or because of an act or omission depriving or otherwise
interfering with title to, or possession or enjoyment of, property,
except that in an action of an equitable nature, interest and the
rate and date from which it shall be computed shall be in the
court's discretion. (b) Date from which computed. Interest
shall be computed from the earliest ascertainable date the cause
of action existed, except that interest upon damages incurred
thereafter shall be computed from the date incurred. Where such
damages were incurred at various times, interest shall be com-
puted upon each item from the date it was incurred or upon all of
the damages from a single reasonable intermediate date. (c) Spe-
cifying date; computing interest. The date from which interest is
to be computed shall be specified in the verdict, report or decision.
If a jury is discharged without specifying the date, the court
upon motion shall fix the date, except that where the date is cer-
tain and not in dispute, the date may be fixed by the clerk of the
court upon affidavit. The amount of interest shall be computed
by the clerk of the court, to the date the verdict was rendered or the
report or decision was made, and included in the total sum
awarded.
Id.
82. E.g., Geohegan v. Union El R.R., 266 Ill. 482, 107 N.E. 768 (1915).




In the various jurisdictions the "general rule in the absence of
statute is that interest cannot be awarded as damages in actions for
personal injury. '8 4 This rule is usually justified by the rationale
that in ". . . actions of this class damages are assessed by a jury up
to the date of the trial, and include all future as well as past suffer-
ings and disabilities. Hence no interest is allowable from the date
of the injury."8 5 This rationale springs from the fact that past and
prospective damages are not usually separated in the jury's verdict.
For example, past damages for medical bills and lost wages already
incurred are lumped together with future medical bills and lost
earnings, which are considered to be too indefinite to estimate be-
fore trial.8 6 However, interest for detention of damages composed
of past medical and hospital bills will occasionally be allowed if the
jury separates them from pain and suffering and future bills and
lost wages in the verdict.87 Interest is not allowed by case law for
detention of damages for pain and suffering because such damages
are considered too speculative.8 8
Some jurisdictions have passed statutes allowing interest for de-
tention of unliquidated personal injury damages.8 9 Most of these
statutes allow interest at the discretion of the jury from the date
of the event, 90 or as a matter of right from the date of commence-
ment of the suit.9 1
84. Id.
85. Blake v. City of Waterbury, 105 Conn. 482, 487, 136 A. 95, 97
(1927).
86. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Newton, 23 Ga. App. 96, 97 S.E. 553 (1918).
87. See, Lawson v. Fordyce, 237 Iowa 28, 21 N.W.2d 69 (1945).
88. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Newton, 23 Ga. App. 96, 97 S.E. 553 (1918).
89. See statutes cited notes 90 and 91.
90. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-05 (1960):
In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from
contract and in every case of oppression, fraud, or malice, interest
may be given in the discretion of the jury.
Id.
91. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-1 (1964):
Interest on damages-In all actions brought to recover damages
for personal injuries sustained by any person, resulting from or
occasioned by the tort of any other person, corporation, associa-
tion or partnership, whether by negligence or by willful intent of
such other person, corporation, association or partnership, and
whether such injury shall have resulted fatally or otherwise, it shall
be lawful for the plaintiff in the complaint to claim interest on
the damages alleged from the date said suit is filed; and when
such interest is so claimed, it shall be the duty of the court, in
entering judgment for the plaintiff in such action, to add to the
amount of damages assessed by the verdict of the jury, or found
by the court, interest on such amount, calculated from the legal
rate from the date such suit was filed to the date of entering
said judgment, and to include the same in said judgment as a part
thereof.
Both types of statutes may be criticized because they allow in-
terest as compensation for detention of both past and future earn-
ings and medical bills. There seems to be an element of unfairness
in allowing a plaintiff interest from the date of the accident or the
filing of suit as compensation for detention of damages which he
will be suffering years in the future; and for which he will be
compensated in one lump sum in the present.
V. COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF THE VARIOUS METHODS OF
COMPENSATING FOR DETENTION OF DAMAGES TO PROPERTY
The rule that allows interest eo nomine or "compensation for
detention of damages" at the discretion of the trier of the facts has
several obvious merits. If the trier of the facts finds that a plaintiff
has tried to settle his case in a reasonable manner, then it would
seem just to require a recalcitrant defendant to reimburse him for
the detention of his damages. On the other hand, if the trier of fact
finds that the plaintiff has demanded an unreasonable sum in set-
tlement, the fault for the defendant's refusal to settle should lay
with the plaintiff. Also, the trier of fact, by its verdict, can imple-
ment the policy which says that a plaintiff, who "through his inac-
tion and failure to prosecute his suit with due diligence, cannot
justly claim to be entitled to damages for unlawful detention of
money by the defendants."92 This rule which allows compensa-
tion for detention of damages, depending upon the culpable actions
of one of the parties, satisfies the premise that "moral wrong is...
an inseparable incident of the assessment of monetary damages."
93
Finally, the rule that compensation for detention will be awarded
in the discretion of the trier of facts may induce a plaintiff to keep
his settlement demands within reasonable bounds, and induce a
defendant to meet these demands. Such a rule encourages settle-
ment before trial, which is always favored by the law.
The alternative to the above discretionary rule is the rule that
a plaintiff should recover compensation for detention of his dam-
ages as a matter of right. This rule is based on the premise that
such detained damages are analogous to a legal debt, which bears
Id.; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-b (Supp. 1969):
Interest from Date of Writ. In all other civil proceedings at
law or in equity in which a verdict is rendered or a finding is
made for pecuniary damages to any party, whether for personal in-
juries, for wrongful death, for consequential damages, for damage
to property, business or reputation, for any other type of loss for
which damages are recognized, there shall be added forthwith by
the clerk of court to the amount of damages interest thereon from
the date of the writ or the filing of the petition to the date of such
verdict or finding even though such interest brings the amount
of the verdict or findings beyond the maximum liability imposed
by law.
Id.
92. Elk v. Bowen, 2 Conn. Cir. 105, 108, 195 A.2d 574, 576 (App. Div.
1963).
93. C. McCORMAcK, DAMAGES § 57a at 227 (1935).
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interest as a matter of right.9 4 However, it should be pointed out
that this rule allowing interest as a matter of right from the date
of the event might tend to encourage plaintiffs to be unrealistic in
their settlement demands so that as much interest as possible can
accrue.
Both of the rules discussed above have favorable aspects.
Therefore, it is submitted that a very salutory rule could be devised
by combining these favorable aspects. As far as property damage is
concerned, it is submitted that the best rule would be to allow dis-
cretionary interest from the time of the happening of the event to
the time suit is filed, and allow interest as of right after suit is
filed. Thus, the trier of facts could evaluate any responsibility for
delay before suit is brought and allow interest accordingly. This
practice will place the onus on the party responsible for the delay.
Then, interest would be awarded as of right for the time between
the bringing of suit and the rendering of a verdict. This practice
would partially satisfy the view which says that a plaintiff is en-
titled to interest as damages for detention just as he is entitled to
interest on a debt.9 5 Under such a rule, a defendant could prevent
a plaintiff from purposely delaying in order to let interest accrue
after suit is filed, by taking remedial action to get the trial moving.9 6
94. A. SEDCWICK, ELEMENTS OF DAMAGES 130-131 (1896):
In other cases of tort, where rights of property, or moneys
worth, only are involved, there is every reason why, if a loss is
fixed at a definite time, the plaintiff should be allowed, as of right,
interest on the money representing it from that time. It is often
said that since the amount may not have been ascertainable till
verdict, it was not a debt; the plaintiff could not demand it, and
the defendant could not pay it. This is perfectly true, but wholly
irrelevant. The question is what has the plaintiff lost, and since his
loss includes not only the rights destroyed or injured but the
value of their use, from the time of the loss, unless he obtains in-
terest as an equivalent he is not remunerated. The essence of
the plaintiff's claim is in the loss, not in the fact that the claim
takes through the medium of a verdict a pecuniary form. It may
be a more correct use of language to say that the plaintiff recov-
ers damages for the loss of the use, and that interest does not begin
to run till after judgment; but since interest is the form which in
these cases the loss of the use always takes, the result will be the
same-that the plaintiff should recover as a matter of right in
addition to the sum of money representing the thing or rights
which he has lost, a sum equal to the legal interest upon it ...
there is no real line of division between liquidated and un-
liquidated demands; (indeed, properly speaking, if a claim for
damages is disputed, it cannot be said to be liquidated until a ver-
dict has been rendered,) . . .
It follows from this, that where only pecuniary injury is in-
volved and there is a definite time, as an initial point for the al-




96. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, App. R.C.P. 209 (1967).
VI. COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF THE VARIOUS METHODS OF
COMPENSATING FOR DETENTION OF PERSONAL
INJURY DAMAGES
The predominant practice of allowing no compensation for de-
tention of personal injury damages was discussed earlier in this
Comment.97 It must be adversely criticized because it does not
compensate a plaintiff for detention of damages for medical bills and
lost wages which have become due and owing before a verdict
is rendered.
Likewise, those statutes which allow a plaintiff compensation
for detention of all damages in a personal injury suit were previ-
ously discussed.0 8 They were adversely criticized because they
would allow interest from the date of suit on future medical bills
and lost wages.9 9 Also, they compenate for detention of damages
for pain and suffering, items perhaps too speculative to allow for
any such compensation.10 0
Perhaps a better rule would be to allow compensation for de-
tention of damages for past medical bills and lost earnings. Such
compensation would be allowed at the discretion of the trier of the
facts for the period between the happening of the event and the
commencement of suit, thus placing the burden for any delay on
the party who occasioned the delay. Such compensation would be
allowed as a matter of right for the period after commencement of
suit. Such a rule would prevent recovery for future medical bills
and lost wages, which would not become payable until a verdict
is rendered. Of course, such a rule would require more effort by
the courts because it would require them to make certain that
juries properly apportion their verdicts. But, any added burden
on the courts may well be worth the just results which might result
from employing such a rule.
CONCLUSION
As was mentioned earlier, Pennsylvania's policy of distinguish-
ing between interest eo nomine and "compensation for detention
of damages, measured by the interest rate" has led to confusion and
97. See discussion under section IVb of this Comment supra.
98. See notes 90 and 91 supra.
99. Cf. C. MCCORMACK, DAMAGES § 56 (1935):
In such cases the recovery is assessed, not on the basis of the loss
capitalized at the time of injury (as in death cases), but on the
basis of the facts as they appear at the time of trial. That is,
plaintiff recovers for past loss of earnings plus his probable future
loss of earnings. Obviously, it would be error to allow interest
for delay in paying the latter sum. On the contrary, the recovery
for loss of future earnings must be reduced under the "present
worth" doctrine because the judgment requires them to be paid
before the earnings would actually accrue. ...
Id. at p. 225.




inequitable results. The distinction has its basis in an outmoded
practice of equating interest with usury. It came into being by
judicial decision and could be overruled by judicial decision. It
is submitted that the distinction should be overruled and that in-
terest eo nomine be awarded for the detention of damages. Thus
order and justice would be returned to this area of the law.
It would probably be better to allow interest eo nomine as a
matter of right after suit is brought. However, this would be such
a radical departure from the present discretionary rule that a court
would probably feel restrained from doing so because of the prin-
ciple of stare decisis.
Fortunately, there is a bill' 01 pending in the Pennsylvania leg-
islature which, if passed into law, would allow interest as of right on
unliquidated tort damages from the time suit is brought. The bill,
which has been passed by the House and now rests in the Sen-
ate, contains the following pertinent sections:
Section 1. Upon receipt of a praecipe from any party
moving to reduce a verdict or award to judgment, the
prothonotary of every court of record shall add to all ver-
dicts or awards recovered in actions for death, personal in-
juries or damages to property caused by unlawful violence
or negligence, prior to entering judgment thereon, interest
at the rate of one-half of one per cent per month from the
date when suit or litigation was commenced in accordance
with the direction and computation set forth in the prae-
cipe, except that interest shall not commence to run until
the expiration of a period of six full months from the date
on which the cause of action arose.
Section 2. The prothonotary shall be entitled to receive
a fee of one dollar ($1) for filing such praecipes and adding
the interest to the verdict or award.
Section 3. This act shall take effect immediately.
10 2
It should be noted that the bill is not completely satisfactory in
its present form. It does not state whether a plaintiff is to be com-
pensated for detention of his damages before suit is brought. Per-
haps, since compensation for this period is not included, the pro-
posed statute would be interpreted to mean that a plaintiff can re-
ceive no compensation for that period. Any such construction
would not fully compensate the plaintiff. Also, the language of the
bill would allow interest from the date suit is commenced on future
medical bills and loss of future earnings. Despite these imper-
fections, the bill indicates that the Pennsylvania Legislature may
soon take a much-needed step in alleviating the confusion and
101. H.B. 275 (1969 Sess.).
102. Id.
inequity which now exists in Pennsylvania in the area of unliqui-
dated tort damages.
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